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Rucho for Minimalists
by Benjamin Plener Cover*
I. INTRODUCTION

In one of last term's most consequential cases, Rucho v. Common
Cause,1 the Supreme Court of the United States decided, 5-4, that
"partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the

reach of the federal courts." 2 This limits the power of the federal courts
to address what many, this author included, consider a significant
threat to American democracy: the manipulation of electoral maps to
favor certain voters or candidates. Federal courts may still intervene to
vindicate the one-person-one-vote principle, enforce the Voting Rights
Act (VRA),3 or invalidate racial gerrymanders. 4 But not to limit
partisan gerrymandering. 5 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Roberts emphasized that he "'does not condone excessive partisan
gerrymandering[,]"' but insisted this problem must be addressed by
state courts, direct democracy, or Congress rather than the federal
courts. 6 For while partisan gerrymandering is "incompatible with

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho. University of Toronto (B.Sc., 2005);
London School of Economics (M.Sc., 2005); Yale Law School (J.D., 2009). I extend my
thanks to all those who organized and participated in the 2019 SEALS Election Law
discussion workshop and the Mercer Law Review symposium, especially my co-panelist
Michael Dimino; to the editors at the Mercer Law Review for their useful feedback; and to
the University of Idaho College of Law for its support of this project. I am also grateful to
Nicole Gabriel and Audrey Thorne for excellent research assistance, to Anna Skiba-Crafts
for her helpful editorial insights, and to David Niven for his ongoing collaboration on a
larger project dealing with non-allocative claims of partisan gerrymandering. Finally, I
am grateful to Aliza Plener Cover for her support and patience throughout this process.
1. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
2. Id. at 2506-07, vacating both Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493 (D. Md.
2018), and Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
4. Rucho, 135 S. Ct. at 2495-2508.
5. Id. at 2508.
6. Id. at 2507.
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democratic principles," 7 regulating it is incompatible with the limited
role of the federal judiciary. 8 When it comes to federal judicial
intervention in electoral districting, partisan gerrymandering is where

the Court draws the line. 9
While Rucho has generated a robust debate about the decision's
correctness and implications,10 relatively little attention has focused on
the decision's precise holding. But how exactly does the Court define
those "partisan gerrymandering claims"11 it deems foreclosed? The
short answer is: it doesn't. While the majority opinion alone uses the
term gerrymander, or a variation thereof, seventy times, it never quite
provides an explicit definition.12 Yet, the term calls for a definition. As
words go, it is an unusually imprecise one: it is "a portmanteau of the
surname 'Gerry' and the word 'salamander"' that we now use as both
noun and verb. 13 As I have argued elsewhere, gerrymandering, "like its
amphibian namesake," has proven "slippery, repeatedly eluding efforts
to curb it[," partly because it is "a slippery concept resistant to precise,

consensus-garnering definition[.]" 14 So, in this Essay, I do not consider
whether Rucho was correctly decided (though I think it was not), nor do
I predict its consequences (which I think depend on future
contingencies). Instead, I ask a logically prior question: what precisely
is its scope? And here's my answer: Rucho holds non-justiciable
"allocative" claims of partisan gerrymandering, those that define the
harm alleged and the remedy sought in terms of the allocation of seats
to the rival political parties, but leaves unaddressed "non-allocative"
claims, those that define harm and remedy without reference to the
votes-seats relationship.
In this Essay, I offer two examples of non-allocative political
gerrymandering claims not considered-and thus, not foreclosed-by
7. Id. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135
S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)).
8. Id. at 2506-07.
9. Id.
10. See Rick Hasen, ELB Symposium: Partisan Gerrymandering After Rucho,
Election Law Blog (July 5, 2019, 7:20 am), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=105878. See also
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court, Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3483321.
11. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506-07.
12. See, e.g., Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491.
13. Benjamin Plener Cover, Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering:An Evaluationof
the Efficiency Gap Proposal, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1143-44 (2018). The pejorative term
was invented in 1812 to critique an electoral map whose salamander-like appearance
allegedly betrayed the political machinations of then-Governor Elbridge Gerry. Id. at
1144.
14. Id.
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Rucho. The first is less likely but makes the conceptual point with
greatest clarity: a claim that a mapmaker manipulates electoral
boundaries for the sole purpose of excluding the residence of a targeted
legislator from the district she represents to punish and suppress her
speech. The second is the primary idea motivating this Essay: a claim
that a mapmaker intentionally and without adequate justification
differentially distributes the geographic benefits and burdens of
electoral districting on the basis of party affiliation. A concrete example
would be an allegation that the mapmaker intentionally and
unjustifiably split "blue" counties far more than "red" counties. 15 A
federal court could adjudicate these non-allocative claims without
saying a word about how many seats each party should win. These
claims lie outside the ambit of Rucho's holding because they avoid the
justiciability problems Rucho identifies. If this reading is correct, the
Supreme Court could one day vindicate a non-allocative claim of
political gerrymandering without reversing Rucho.
Part II situates Rucho in jurisprudential context, by briefly tracing
the Court's struggle to determine whether and how federal courts can
regulate electoral districting. After initial reluctance to intervene, the
Court embraced the one-person-one-vote principle based on a
non-allocative theory of vote dilution, whereby a mapmaker dilutes the
weight of a disfavored voter by placing her in an overpopulated
district. 16 But the Court has struggled to conceptualize and address
claims that a mapmaker has manipulated districts' shape, rather than
their population size, to favor voters or candidates on the basis of
politics. 17 Part III presents the argument that Rucho is limited to
allocative claims of partisan gerrymandering. Since the Court never
defines the term explicitly, its precise scope must be determined based
on context, prior caselaw, and the logic of the majority's justiciability
analysis. This analysis demonstrates that the Court conceptualized
partisan gerrymandering as allocative vote dilution, whereby a
mapmaker reallocates votes towards a favored party by subjecting
disfavored voters to packing and cracking techniques that diminish the
efficacy of their votes. While some have framed partisan
15. Throughout this Essay, I refer to counties (or voters, or candidates) as red (or
blue) to connote their support of (or affiliation with) the Republican (or Democratic) Party.
Prior to the contested presidential election in 2000, broadcast networks tended to
alternate this color-coding, but since Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, blue and red have become
party loyalists. See Philip Bump, Red us. Blue: A history of how we use political colors,
WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016, 7:27 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/ 11/08/red-vs-blue-a-brief-history-of-how-we-use-political-colors/.
16. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2501.
17. Id. at 2497.
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gerrymandering in terms of associational harm rather than vote
dilution, this associational framing is still allocative or at least
quasi-allocative in the sense that neither harm nor remedy can be
quantified without reference to the votes-seats relationship. Part IV
presents two examples of non-allocative claims of political gerrymander
that are not foreclosed by Rucho, one based on candidate exclusion, the
other on differential geographic burdens.
II. THE COURT'S DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION

To understand Rucho, we must briefly consider the conceptual and
jurisprudential terrain upon which it stands. Rucho is the Court's most
recent pronouncement on federal judicial regulation of electoral
districting, 18 but it is certainly not its first, and it won't be the last. The
Court has struggled with these questions for over a century, and its
answers have varied over time and with the type of gerrymandering at
issue. The Court's evolving approach led the Rucho majority to conceive
of partisan gerrymandering in allocative terms. 19 This Section provides
the essential background: a primer on how gerrymandering has
repeatedly eluded the Court's grasp.
A. Early Resistance to Intervention
Gerrymandering has plagued the American electoral system from its
inception to the present day: the States have relied heavily on
geographic electoral districting (GED), whereby voters select
representatives through separate elections in geographic subunits that
partition the jurisdiction; 20 mapmakers have abused their districting
power, subordinating the public interest in sound representation to
advance the narrower interests of favored candidates or voters; citizens
have decried how such gerrymandering can turn districting into "the
business of rigging elections[;]" 21 and the Supreme Court has hesitated
to intervene.

The Court has long understood Article III of the federal
Constitution 22 to both confer and constrain judicial power, limiting the
federal courts to exercise power "judicial" in nature and adjudicate only
18. Id. at 2506-07.
19. Id. at 2499.
20. See Nicholas Stephanopoulous, Our Election Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
769, 808 (2013). See also Cover, supra note 13, at 1142 n.28.
21. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004). (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (quoting John Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election,
WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B1).
22. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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those "Cases" or "Controversies" to which this power "shall extend[.]" 23
From this textual basis, the Court has derived a "political question"
doctrine that precludes federal court adjudication of certain disputes
deemed more amenable to political rather than judicial resolution based
on considerations of authority, competence, or prudence. 24 A dispute
may present a non-justiciable political question because its "resolution
is textually committed to a coordinate political department" 25 or
because a federal court cannot discern "judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" to resolve it "without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." 26
Federal court regulation of electoral districting implicates these
considerations of authority, competence, and prudence in the context of
electoral federalism and separation of powers. GED is not the only way
to run elections for multimember bodies like Congress, state
legislatures, and city councils. Each representative could be selected
through "at-large" jurisdiction-wide contests.2 7 Or seats on the
multimember body could be apportioned to political parties in
proportion to the votes they earn in a single jurisdiction-wide election
under some system of proportional representation (PR). 28 But GED has

23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). The Court synthesized the political
question doctrine into a six-factor inquiry. Id. at 217. My discussion here draws on an
influential opinion by Justice Sotomayor, which organizes the six Baker factors into these
three categories. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 202-07 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
25. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 203. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229
(1993) (challenge to impeachment procedures presents non-justiciable political question
because Article I, Section 3 gives the Senate the "sole Power to try all Impeachments.").
26. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)
(challenge to riot-response practices presents non-justiciable political question in part
because Court lacks competence to evaluate "complex, subtle, and professional decisions
as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force").
27. This is how many Representatives were selected in the nation's first five decades,
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 745, n.3 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring), and how every
Senator is selected today, U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1.
28. PR is often used in other countries and sometimes used at the local level in the
U.S.
See
Electoral
Systems
Around
the
World,
FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/research-electoralsystems-world (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (As
of 2012, 29 of 35 major democracies surveyed used some form of PR); Jurisdictions Using
Fair
Representation
Voting,
FAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/jurisdictions-using-fair-rep#full-list-of fair voting-jurisdictions
(last visited Nov. 9, 2019) (over 200 U.S. jurisdictions use some form of PR in local
elections).
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advantages over at-large elections29 and PR.30 And the federal
Constitution neither mandates nor proscribes these practices. The
Elections Clause 31 simply authorizes the States and Congress to
regulate elections for federal legislators, 32 while other provisions
empower Congress to judge federal legislative elections. 33 Congress has
used this power to both require and constrain electoral districting.
Federal statute has required electoral districting for selection of
Representatives for over 175 years and currently requires
single-member electoral districting. 34 While the Elections Clause
applies only to federal elections, the federal Constitution contemplates
state and congressional regulation of state and local elections.35 But the

29. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) ("The very essence of
districting is to produce a different-a more 'politically fair'-result than would be
reached with elections at large, in which the winning party would take 100% of the
legislative seats.").
30. These advantages include: representation of less populous communities with
distinct geographic-based interests; a relationship between representative and
constituent; more robust and competitive elections; and the stability, accountability, and
moderation associated with a two-party system. See Nathaniel Persily, Reply: In Defense
of Foxes GuardingHenhouses: The Case for JudicialAcquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting
Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 650 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket:
Partisan Gerrymanderingand Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325,
1350-51 (1987).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. The Court has interpreted the Elections Clause broadly to
cover the decisions of whether and how to draw electoral districts. See Arizona v.
Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2013) (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285
U.S. 355, 366 (1932)).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns
and Qualifications of its own Members"). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, as modified
by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (apportionment based on decennial census conducted "in
such manner as [Congress] shall by Law direct").
34. See An Act for the apportionment of Representatives among the several States
according to the sixth census, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 1, 491 (enacted June 25, 1842); 2 U.S.C.
§ 2c. Federal statute once did, but no longer does, impose requirements of contiguity,
compactness, and equal population. Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, § 3, 37 Stat. 14, 14,
invalidated by Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 8 (1932) (holding statute was impliedly
repealed by the Act of 1929).
35. Voter qualifications for elections of federal legislators are based on voter
qualification for elections of state legislators. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. Congress has
broad, but not unlimited, authority to regulate state and location elections pursuant to its
power to enforce the guarantees of due process and equal protection, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5, and the prohibition against race-based vote denial, U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (upholding the original
Voting Rights Act as a valid exercise of congressional enforcement power), with Shelby
Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 530 (2013) (invalidating a provision of the current Voting
Rights Act as beyond the scope of Congress's enforcement powers).
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text provides no specific directive on whether or how electoral districts
are to be drawn. The Constitution speaks of individual rights and
structural principles implicated by districting, but only in sweeping
generalities such as "equal protection," "privileges and immunities,"

"freedom of speech," election "by the People," and "a Republican Form of
Government."3 6

For these reasons, the Court was reluctant to intervene, preferring to
leave districting matters to the States and to Congress. Before the
reapportionment revolution, the Court entertained procedural
challenges to electoral maps, but refused to invalidate them on
substantive grounds. 37 In 1946, writing for a plurality in Colegrove r.
Green,38 Justice Frankfurter famously warned that "Courts ought not to
enter this political thicket."3 9 Frankfurter read the Elections Clause as
an exclusive grant of power and concluded that electoral districting was
"of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial
determination." 40 The relief petitioners sought was "beyond [the
Court's] competence to grant" because "[t]he remedy for unfairness in
districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or
to invoke the ample powers of Congress." 41
B. Malapportionmentas Non-Allocatire Vote Dilution
But
ultimately
the
Court
reversed
course,
declared
malapportionment claims justiciable, and embraced the doctrine of "one
person, one vote" (OPOV)42 based on an intuitive theory of vote dilution.
This theory rests on the principle, long recognized by the Court, that
the right to vote is implicated when an electoral practice operates to
reduce the efficacy, or "dilute" the power, of a person's vote. For

36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; U.S.
CONST. amend. I, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1.
37. Compare State of Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916) and
Smiley, 285 U.S. 355; with Wood, 287 U.S. 1.
38. 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 552.
41. Id. at 552, 556. Of the seven Justices who participated in the decision, only two
joined Frankfurter's plurality. Three others favored intervention. Id. at 550. Justice
Rutledge, the deciding vote, thought the Court could, but should not, intervene in party
because invalidation of the electoral map could result in at-large elections-a "cure ...
worse than the disease." Id. at 566 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the judgment).
42. Baker, 369 U.S. at 208-10 (justiciability); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1964) (House of Representatives); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (state
legislatures); Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (general purpose local governing
bodies).
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example, the Court previously held that Congress had the power to
criminalize "ballot-box stuffing"-unlawfully casting numerous ballots
for a favored candidate-because that practice "diluted" the power of
other ballots lawfully cast. 43 OPOV extends this concept of vote dilution
from the "ballot-stuffing" context to the malapportionment context.
Since "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of
the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting
the free exercise of the franchise" 44 the concept of "political equality . .
can mean only one thing-one person, one vote." 45

Note

that this

conception

of vote

dilution

is

non-allocative.

Malapportionment dilutes a person's vote by placing that person in a

relatively populous district. 46 The existence and extent of this vote
dilution can be quantified based solely on population figures for each
electoral district, without any consideration of which party wins which
seat. 47 Judges adjudicating these claims need not consider the
allocation of political power; they simply "multiply and divide." 48
C. ConceptualizingShape Manipulation
As the Court developed the OPOV doctrine, questions quickly arose
about other forms of gerrymandering. OPOV constrained districts'
(population) size, but not their shape. And mapmakers could still favor
certain candidates or voters while maintaining substantial population
equality by manipulating the shape of districts boundaries or using
multimember districts to submerge disfavored voters. 49 Shortly after
Reynolds v. Sims, 50 the Court refused to declare multi-member districts
per se unconstitutional, but recognized such districts would "constitute
43. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 386 (1944) (federal criminal prohibition
protected the right of Americans in federal elections against "having their votes impaired,
lessened, diminished, diluted and destroyed by fictitious ballots fraudulently cast and
counted."). See also Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657 (1884); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941).
44. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (citing South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
45. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
46. See City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
47. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 751 (Stevens, J., concurring).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 765 ("[I]f the shape of legislative districts is entirely unconstrained, the
dominant majority could [replace a malapportioned map with] an even more
grotesque-appearing map that reflects acceptable numerical equality with even greater
political inequality."). Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 751 ("A districting plan may create
multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but
invidiously discriminatory. . . .").
50. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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an invidious discrimination . .
if [they] . .
'operate to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the
voting population."' 5 1
In 1973, the Court approved a bipartisan gerrymander, intentionally
drawn to produce "a proportionate number of Republican and
Democratic legislative seats" based on vote shares in the three prior
statewide elections. 52 The Court was untroubled "that virtually every
Senate and House district line was drawn with [this] conscious intent" 53
and that the mapmakers carved up the state into safe blue districts and
safe red districts to secure this goal.54 The Court warned that electoral
maps "may be vulnerable, if racial or political groups have been fenced
out of the political process and their voting strength invidiously
minimized" but refused to "attempt[] the impossible task of extirpating
politics from what are the essentially political processes of the sovereign
States." 55 The only potentially viable political gerrymandering claim
became a partisan gerrymandering claim. But while the Court
developed a doctrinal framework for claims of racial gerrymandering, 56
it left partisan gerrymandering unaddressed. 57
The Court squarely addressed a partisan gerrymandering claim for
the first time in 1986, and the question fractured the Court: six Justices
agreed the issue was justiciable but disagreed on the proper standard;
Justice White proposed a more stringent standard while Justice Powell
proposed a more flexible one; and the other three Justices insisted there
was no standard because the issue was non-justiciable. 58 When the

51. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S.
433, 439 (1965)); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143 (1971) (quoting Fortson, 379 U.S.
at 439); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973); Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66.
52. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 738.
53. Id. at 752.
54. Id. at 738 n.4 (seventy safe blue seats, sixty safe red seats, twenty-one swing
seats).
55. Id. at 754.
56. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993); Chavis, 403 U.S. 124; Regester, 412 U.S. 755; Bolden, 446 U.S. 55.
57. Justice Stevens urged the Court to invalidate any electoral map that "serve[s] no
purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or
political. . . " Karcher, 462 U.S. at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
suggested the Court could identify such a map by considering the process that produced it
and substantive factors of irregular district shape and respect for local political
boundaries. Id. at 750-51 (Stevens, J., concurring).
58. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist); id. at 124 (plurality) (written by Justice
White and joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun); id. at 161 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by Justice Stevens).
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Court reconsidered the question in the 2004, the dissensus persisted:
the four more liberal Justices agreed on justiciability, but not the
proper standard; the four more conservative Justices insisted the
question was non-justiciable; and Justice Kennedy split the difference
with Hamlet-esque indecision, rejecting every standard he considered,
but holding out hope the right standard might one day emerge. 59 In the
eighteen years between Bandemer 60 and Vieth, 61 not a single plaintiff
survived the motions stage under Justice White's more stringent
standard.62 This standard, in turn, did not survive Vieth, but the
doctrinal limbo did, as federal judges, uncertain whether partisan
gerrymandering claims were to be or not to be, uniformly rejected them.
Until two years ago. That's when a three-judge federal panel, for the
first time ever, struck down an electoral map as a partisan
gerrymander, based on a standard tailor-made to satisfy Justice
Kennedy.63 The Court reversed the decision on standing grounds
without reaching the merits, remanding so each plaintiff could
satisfactorily demonstrate residence in a challenged district.64 But
shortly after that punt, more federal panels found more partisan
gerrymanders. 65 Whack-a-mole style, more cases headed to the Court,
these ones harder to dismiss on procedural grounds. 66 The Court
ordered full briefing and argument in two of them: Rucho, involving an
alleged pro-Republican gerrymander in North Carolina, and Benisek, 67

59. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (plurality) (opinion written by Justice Scalia and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices, O'Connor, and Thomas); id. at 339 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 346-47 (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Ginsberg); id. at 35667 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 306-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Two years later,
Justice Kennedy clarified the criteria any adequate standard must satisfy. League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 413-23 (2006) [hereinafter LULAC].
60. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
61. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
62. Id. at 279-80.
63. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp 3d 837, 884 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
64. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018).
65. See, e.g., Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct.
1455 (2017).
66. By federal statute, nonfrivolous constitutional challenges to congressional or state
legislative electoral maps are heard by a three-judge federal panel, 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a);
Shapiro, 136 S. Ct. at 455, with direct, nondiscretionary appeal to the Supreme Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1253; Cooper, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465 n.2 (2017); so the Court cannot simply deny
cert for these cases. See Cover, supra note 13, 1138 at n.14.
67. 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018).
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involving an alleged pro-Democratic gerrymander in Maryland.68 While
the Court considered these two consolidated cases, federal panels struck
down congressional maps in Ohio and Michigan.69 If the Court were to
finally end this doctrinal limbo and embrace a standard for partisan
gerrymandering claims, it was now or never. But with Justice Kennedy

retired, and Justice Kavanaugh on the Court, Chief Justice Roberts had
become the swing vote. And Chief Justice Roberts, it seems, chose
never, embracing many of the arguments made by Justice O'Connor in
Bandemer and Justice Scalia in Vieth.70 In this way, the decision in
Rucho ended a debate the Court began thirty-three years prior. I turn
now to a reading of Rucho, in light of the way partisan gerrymandering
has been framed through this debate, from Bandemer to Vieth to Gill.71
III. RUCHO FORECLOSES ONLY ALLOCATIVE CLAIMS

A. Rucho's Allocatire Framing
This debate was primarily framed in terms of "vote dilution," but a
new type of vote dilution. Whereas malapportionment vote dilution is
based on a district's population size, this new kind of vote dilution is
based on district shape. 72 Malapportionment dilutes a person's vote by
placing that person in a district that is overpopulated. 73 Shape
manipulation dilutes a person's vote by placing that person in a district
that has been subjected to the "familiar techniques of political
gerrymandering." 74 While the vote dilution of malapportionment is

68. Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018), vacated by Rucho, 139 S.
Ct. 2484; Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493 (D. Md. 2018), vacated by Benisek v. Lamone, 138
S. Ct. 1942.
69. Ohio A Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder, 373 F. Supp. 3d 978, 994 (S.D. Ohio
2019); League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Benson, 373 F. Supp. 3d 867, 879 (E.D. Mich.
2019) (vacated by Chatfield v. League of Women Voters, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 6515 (Oct. 21,
2019)).
70. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497-98 (citing Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 147) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring.
71. Compare Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484, with Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, Veith, 541 U.S.
267, and Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916.
72. The panel that the Court reversed in Bandemer emphasized this distinction from
the outset, noting the issue was not "voters per district, but rather ... the shapes of the
districts." Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1491 (S.D. Ind. 1984), rev'd, 478 U.S.
109 (1986). See also Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 124.
73. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 116.
74. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 117 n.6 (plurality opinion). We now call these techniques
"packing" and "cracking." Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500-01 ('packing" and "cracking"); Vieth,
541 U.S at 289 (same); Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1924 (same); Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at
799 (same); Benson, 373 F. Supp. 3d at 897-98 (same); Householder, 373 F. Supp. 3d at
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non-allocative, this new kind of vote dilution is inescapably allocative,
because it depends on the way a district's shape limits a party's ability
to translate votes into seats. 75 This allocative theory of vote dilution
links the geographic relationship between voters and districts to the
aggregate relationship between seats and votes. "Allocative vote
dilution" occurs when a mapmaker strategically distributes voters
across districts so that one party (say, blue) wins more seats and the
other (red) wins fewer.76 To favor the blue party, the mapmaker targets
red voters, dividing (i.e. "cracking") them into multiple districts where
blue prevails by a small margin, or concentrating (i.e. "packing") them
into districts where red wins by a large margin. 77 Cracking channels
votes to red candidates who lose. Packing channels them to red
candidates who were going to win anyway.

Both strategies create

districts where (many) red votes do not help to elect additional red
candidates. As a result, red votes translate into relatively few red seats.
By manipulating district shape, the mapmaker dilutes the potency of
red votes and thereby reallocates to the blue party seats that would
otherwise have gone to the red party. Hence the term: allocative vote
dilution. 78
994 (same). Earlier cases referred to "stacking" and "splitting." See Bandemer, 603 F.
Supp. at 1491 ('stacking" or "cracking" or "splitting"); Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 116-17
(plurality opinion) ('stacking" and "splitting"); LULAC, 548 U.S. at 445 ("splitting").
75. See Bandemer, 603 F. Supp. at 1491 (map allegedly diminished "the ability of the
targeted group to elect representatives according to their proportion of the population");
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 354 (Souter, J., dissenting) ('the point of the gerrymander is to capture
seats by manipulating district lines to diminish the weight of the other party's votes in
elections"); Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1922-23 (map allegedly "diminish[ed] the ability of
Wisconsin Democrats to convert Democratic votes into Democratic seats in the
legislature."); Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 800 (the map "intentionally ensur[ed]
that Representatives from one party have a disproportionate voice in Congress"); Benson,
373 F. Supp. 3d at 898 (through gerrymandering, "a dominant party can prevent a
disfavored party from ever obtaining a majority of the seats."); Householder, 373 F. Supp
3d at 994 ('districts that are so skewed toward one party that the electoral outcome is
predetermined").
76. The theory generally assumes that every candidate affiliates with, and every
voter supports, one of the two major parties, thus ignoring third-party and independent
candidates and voters. Though it is possible to define partisan gerrymandering with more
than two parties, this two-party assumption generally prevails in practice and in
discourse because it simplifies the analysis and in modern American elections many
candidates and voters do indeed identify with one of the two major political parties. See
Eric McGhee, Measuring Efficiency in Redistricting, 16 Election L.J. 417, 426-31 (2017).
77. See supra note 49.
78. In Bandemer, Justice Powell suggested a flexible standard similar to the one
Justice Stevens proposed in Karcher. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Karcher, 462 U.S. at 755-59 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
Under this standard, a court could at least sometimes identify a partisan gerrymander
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This is what the Rucho majority has in mind when it refers to a claim
of partisan gerrymandering. Recall that Chief Justice Roberts authored
the majority opinion in both Rucho and Gill. In Rucho, Roberts
describes Gill's holding as follows: "a plaintiff asserting a partisan
gerrymandering claim based on a theory of vote dilution must establish
standing by showing he lives in an allegedly 'cracked' or 'packed'
district."79 The Court in Rucho similarly speaks in terms of allocative
vote dilution when it characterizes the decisions of the three-judge
panels below.80
B. Rucho's Allocative Logic
Just as the Rucho Court's opinion is expressed in the language of
allocative vote dilution, its justiciability analysis is predicated on the
logic of allocative vote dilution. Why does the Court foreclose partisan
gerrymandering claims? Because such claims present non-justiciable
political questions. Why do such claims present non-justiciable political
questions? Because there is no adequate standard with which to
adjudicate them. 81 The bulk of the majority's analysis consists of
without ever considering the proper votes-seats relationship. Id. at 173, n.12 (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("In some cases, proof of grotesque district shapes may, without more, provide
convincing proof of unconstitutional gerrymandering."). But the Bandemer plurality
rejected this approach, insisted that a partisan gerrymandering claim requires, as "a
threshold showing of discriminatory vote dilution," id. at 143, a demonstration that the
electoral map "will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the
political process as a whole," id. at 143. This showing requires more than "a mere lack of
proportionate results in one election." Id. at 139-40. Plaintiffs must demonstrate both "a
history (actual or projected) of disproportionate results" and "indicia of lack of political
power and the denial of fair representation." Id. From that point on, partisan
gerrymandering claims were understood as claims of allocative vote dilution.
79. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2492 (citing Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1921).
80. Id. at 2502 (explaining that the panel that decided Common Cause, 318 F. Supp.
3d 777, "concluded that ...
North Carolina's 2016 Plan violated [equal protection] by
intentionally diluting the voting strength of Democrats" such that in all but one district
"the dilution of [Democratic] votes ... in [the] district-by virtue of cracking or packingis likely to persist in subsequent elections .... "). See also id. at 2493 (explaining that the
panel that decided Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 498, "concluded that ... the Plan violated
the First Amendment by diminishing their 'ability to elect their candidate of choice'
because of their party affiliation and voting history"). The Benisek panel found that
"Democrat[s] ... craft[ed] a map that would specifically transform the Sixth District into
one that would predictably elect a Democrat by removing [about 66,000] Republican
voters from the District and [adding 24,000] Democratic voters in their place," thereby
reallocating the blue-red seat split in the state's congressional delegation from 6-2 to 7-1.
Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 518. Common Cause and Benisek were consolidated in Rucho,
139 S. Ct. 2482.
81. With the reapportionment revolution, the Court rejected Justice Frankfurter's
suggestion in Colegrove that the constitutional text exclusively committed to Congress
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critiquing each standard the appellees and the dissent propose and
ultimately concluding that "none meets the need for a limited and
precise standard that is judicially discernible and manageable." 82 This
conclusion is predicated on the allocative nature of the underlying legal
theory in two ways. First, because the relief the petitioner seeks asks
much from the court-a reallocation of political power-the court
demands much from the standard, subjecting each proffered candidate
to the most exacting scrutiny. Second, because the alleged harm-an
unfair allocation of political power- involves the votes-seats
relationship, it is exceedingly difficult to craft a standard that survives
this exacting scrutiny.

The Court repeatedly emphasizes the allocative nature of the relief
sought. The theory essentially asks the federal courts to "apportion
political power" 83 by "tak[ing] the extraordinary step of reallocating
power and influence between political parties." 84 Such allocative relief
unlimited in scope and duration,"
would entail an "intervention . .
because every redrawn map could be challenged as a partisan
gerrymander and the one-person-one-vote doctrine requires the
redrawing of every map in every state at least once a decade. 85 This
unlimited intervention would constitute "an unprecedented expansion
of judicial power .... into one of the most intensely partisan aspects of
American political life." 86 The Rucho Court is clearly troubled by the
prospect of "the unelected and politically unaccountable branch of the
Government
Federal
assuming such
an extraordinary
and
unprecedented role." 87 Whenever the Supreme Court strikes down a
state law, federalism and separation of powers concerns arise. But
when the Court strikes down an electoral map, in a way that inures to
the benefit of one and the detriment of the other major political party,
these concerns are heightened, as are the risks that the intervention
will undermine the perceived legitimacy of the Court as an apolitical
and nonpartisan institution. At this moment, when American politics
have been particularly polarized and the Supreme Court nomination
and the States substantive questions of electoral districting. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
Rucho did not revisit that question. See Rucho, at 2495-96 (citing Wesberry, 376 U.S. 1;
Shaw, 509 U.S. 630) ("[O]ur cases have held that there is a role for the courts with respect
to at least some issues that could arise from a State's drawing of congressional districts.").
82. Id. at 2502.
83. Id. at 2499-2500 (embracing Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Vieth, 541 U.S.
at 291, that '"If]airness' [is not] a judicially manageable standard").
84. Id. at 2502.
85. Id. at 2507.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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process has been particularly politicized, it is not surprising that Chief
Justice Roberts, Rucho's author and an institutionalist deeply
committed to preserving the perceived legitimacy of the Court, would be
particularly reluctant for the Court to assume this allocative function.
In short, this request for allocative relief asks a great deal from the
Court.
And so the Court asks a great deal from the petitioners in the form of
a legal standard to constrain, guide, and legitimize the judicial exercise
of allocative power. "If federal courts are to 'inject themselves into the
most heated partisan issues"' 88 "they must be armed with a standard
that can reliably differentiate unconstitutional from 'constitutional
political gerrymandering."' 89 If there are "no legal standards to limit
and direct their decisions" then "[fJederal judges have no license to
reallocate political power between the two major political parties." 90
And the quality of this standard-the extent of its capacity to constrain,
guide, and legitimize-must be commensurate with the scope of the
allocative power the standard is designed to constrain, guide, and
legitimize. Thus, the standard must be: "grounded in a 'limited and
precise rationale"';91 "'clear, manageable, and politically neutral"'; 92
"limited and precise" once again; 93 and "judicially discernible and
manageable." 94 When evaluating proffered standards, the Rucho Court
will accept nothing less than the gold standard.
While the allocative nature of the relief sought leads the Court to
demand a great deal from the governing legal standard, the allocative
nature of the alleged harm makes it exceedingly difficult for any
standard to meet these demands. Essentially, the alleged harm is too
few seats for the disfavored party.95 As I argue infra, this claim of too
few seats is ultimately an allegation of theft, which requires a theory of
electoral property rights. 96 This theory must answer two tough
questions: (1) what is the baseline?, i.e. how many seats should a party
get (for a given vote share)?; and (2) what is the threshold?, i.e. how far
can the allocation depart from this baseline before the constitution line
88. Id. at 2499 (quoting Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 145 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
89. Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)).
90. Id. at 2507 (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (plurality opinion)).
91. Id. at 2498 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
92. Id. (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
93. Id. at 2502.
94. Id.
95. More precisely, the alleged harm is an unacceptably low expected seat share
given the disfavored party's expected vote share.
96. See infra Part IV.

710

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

is crossed? As discussed supra, the Constitution provides limited
textual guidance. 97 So the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering
claims based on a theory of allocative vote dilution reduces to this
challenge: can you discern from this limited textual guidance a legal
standard that will determine when a map gives one political party too
few seats in a way that is sufficiently "limited and precise"; 98 "clear,
manageable, and politically neutral"99 to adequately constrain, guide,
and legitimize "an unprecedented expansion of judicial power . . into
one of the most intensely partisan aspects of American political life"
whereby the Court greenlights "an intervention . .
unlimited in scope
and duration," consisting of "the extraordinary step of reallocating
power and influence between political parties"? 100
And there's one more thing, an additional constraint that makes it
ever harder to identify an adequate standard. Ask the average
American how many seats a party should win if they earn 60% of the
vote, and some might answer "60%." Indeed, this may be the most
obvious, the most intuitive, the most popular response. This intuition is
called strict proportionality, the notion that a party's seat share should
equal its vote share.101 It's an elegant, compelling, attractive answer to
the baseline question of how many seats a party should get. And it's off
limits.102 So the challenge is to identify a standard not predicated on a
norm of proportional representation that satisfies the majority's
exacting scrutiny. 103 Appellees, amici, and the dissent all offered
97. See supra Part II.
98. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502.
99. Id. at 2498 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
100. Id. at 2502, 2507.
101. See Cover, supra note 13, at 1148-49.
102. Throughout the Court's decades-long dissensus on partisan gerrymandering, the
proposition that has garnered the most support is that the Constitution contains no
requirement of strict proportional representation. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499 (plurality
opinion) (quoting Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130) ("Our cases ... clearly foreclose any claim
that the Constitution requires proportional representation[.]"). See also Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986); Bolden, 446 U.S. at 75-76; Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132;
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 419.
103. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2501. The allocative logic of the Rucho majority's
justiciability analysis is revealed with particular clarity by its contrast between partisan
gerrymandering claims of vote dilution, which are allocative, and malapportionment
claims of vote dilution, which are not. OPOV "is relatively easy to administer as a matter
of math [but the] same cannot be said of partisan gerrymandering claims, because the
Constitution supplies no objective measure for assessing whether a districting map treats
a political party fairly." Id. OPOV is based on "the principle that each person must have
an equal say in the election of representatives," that "each vote must carry equal weight."
Id. Allocative vote dilution is based on the principle "that a person is entitled to have his
political party achieve representation in some way commensurate to its share of statewide
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candidates thoughtfully designed to meet this challenge, and the
majority rejected each one. 104
C. Quasi-AllocatireAssociational Harm
In his Vieth concurrence, Justice Kennedy suggested a First
Amendment 105 analysis to partisan gerrymandering based on "whether
political classifications were used to burden a group's representational
rights." 106 In her Gill concurrence, Justice Kagan developed Justice
Kennedy's insight, observing that "the associational harm of a partisan
gerrymander is distinct from vote dilution" and suggesting that while
standing for a vote dilution claim is district-specific, standing for an
associational claim is state-wide. 107 Justice Kagan argued that a
partisan gerrymander inflicted a legal injury upon a state resident and
active member of the disfavored party, even if the member suffered no
vote dilution because his individual district was not subject to cracking
or packing techniques. 108
[I]f the gerrymander ravaged the party he works to support, then he
indeed suffers harm . . . . This is the kind of "burden" to "a group of
voters' representational rights" Justice Kennedy spoke of ....
deprived of their natural political strength by a partisan
gerrymander, [members of the state's disfavored party] may face
difficulties fundraising, registering voters, attracting volunteers,
generating support from independents, and recruiting candidates to
run for office (not to mention eventually accomplishing their policy
objectives) . . . . And what is true for party members may be doubly
true for party officials and triply true for the party itself . . .. By
placing a state party at an enduring electoral disadvantage, the
gerrymander weakens its capacity to perform all its functions. 109
Following Justice Kagan's suggestion, those federal panels finding

partisan gerrymanders in the period between Gill and Rucho found
both vote dilution and associational harm. 110
support[,]" that "each party must be influential in proportion to its number of supporters."
Id. According to Rucho, the former principle can be discerned from the constitutional text,
but the latter one cannot.
104. Id. at 2502-06.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
106. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 315.
107. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring).
108. Id. (Kagan, J., concurring).
109. Id. (Kagan, J., concurring).
110. Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777; Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493; Householder,
373 F. Supp. 3d 978; Benson, 373 F. Supp. 3d 867.
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While Justice Kagan's theory of partisan gerrymandering is based on
associational harm rather than vote dilution, it is still allocative in an
important sense because the ultimate cause of the relevant
representational burdens is the misallocation of power to parties
incommensurate with their popularity. The reason it is harder to
engage in associational activities like "fundraising, registering voters,
attracting volunteers, generating support from independents, and

recruiting candidates to run for office" is because the map distorts the
votes-seats relationship in a way that "ravage[s] the [disfavored]
party," "depriv[ing it of its] natural political strength" and "placing [it]
at an enduring electoral disadvantage."111 In this sense, the
associational claim is quasi-allocative: while the harm can be expressed
as disparate burdens on associational activities, the cause of the harm
is misallocation of power between rival political parties and so the only
remedy is reallocation of power between those parties. This
quasi-allocative associational claim presents the same justiciability
problems as the allocative vote dilution claim: it asks the Court to
perform allocative interventions based on some legal standard that
identifies an ideal baseline allocation of political power and prohibits
deviation from this baseline beyond some specified threshold of
constitutional tolerance.
The Rucho majority could have rejected this associational theory
because it is quasi-allocative. Instead, after a brief discussion, the
Rucho majority dismissed it, declaring that "the slight anecdotal
evidence [of First Amendment burdens] found sufficient . .
in these
cases shows that this too is not a serious standard for separating
constitutional from unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering." 112
IV. NON-ALLOCATIVE CLAIMS

Allocative vote-dilution is not the only way to define or conceptualize
partisan gerrymandering. A plausible claim of partisan gerrymandering

can be based on alternative, non-allocative, theories of constitutional
111. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring).
112. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2504. Finally, the Rucho Court summarily noted and readily
rejected two additional arguments embraced by the North Carolina panel: (1) a State
exceeds its power under the Elections Clause when it draws a congressional map to
'"disfavor the interests of supporters of a particular candidate or party in drawing
congressional districts[,]' id. at 2506 (quoting Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 937);
and (2) "partisangerrymanders violate 'the core principle of [our] republican government'
preserved in Art. I, § 2, 'namely, that the voters should choose their representatives, not
the other way around."' Id. (quoting Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2677 (alteration
in original)). The Rucho Court viewed these structural legal theories as claims under the
Guarantee Clause, which are generally considered non-justiciable. Id.

R UCHO FOR MINIMALISTS

2020]

713

harm and remedy. These claims were never considered, and thus are
not foreclosed, by Rucho. 1 3 And these non-allocative claims do not
present the same justiciability problems as the allocative vote dilution
theory of partisan gerrymandering,114 so they may be within the reach
of the federal courts.
A. Theft, Robbery, & Gerrymandering
Obviously,

the

reallocation

of

political

power

is

partisan

gerrymandering's primary purpose, and the misallocation of political
power is one of partisan gerrymandering's greatest evils. But, as others

have long noted, the harm of partisan gerrymandering is not limited to
the distortion of the votes-seats relationship. 115 In this sense, if partisan
gerrymandering were conceptualized as a crime, that crime would be
robbery and not merely theft. From the perspective of cold hard cash,
the legal harm suffered by a robbery victim is precisely the benefit
motivating the robber-the illicit transfer of property from its rightful
owner to its wrongful taker. But robbery is more than theft. It inflicts
harm upon the victim, and upon society, distinct from and greater than
the simple property transfer that motivates the robber. Many of these
harms are independent of that property transfer, and obtained even
when an attempted robbery is unsuccessful or the property transfer
itself is lawful.11 6 Partisan gerrymandering is like robbery. It is an
aggressive transfer of political power (measured in legislative seats)
from one (political) party (the victim) to another (the perpetrator). Like

113. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) ("It is the general rule, of course, that
a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below."). PDK Labs.
Inc. v. United States DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring)
("[T]he cardinal principle of judicial restraint-if it is not necessary to decide more, it is
necessary not to decide more-counsels us to go no further."). See also Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 373 (2010) (Roberts, C., concurring) (the Court's policy is "'never to
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied."') (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)).
114. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502 ("[P]artisan gerrymandering claims ... ask for a
fair share of political power and influence, with all the justiciability conundrums that
entails.").
115. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Causes and Consequences of Gerrymandering,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2018); Richard Briffault, Electoral Redistricting and the
Supreme Court: Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering, 14
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 397 (2005); Ellen D. Katz, The Law of Democracy: New Issues
in Minority Representation: Resurrecting the White Primary, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 325
(2004).
116. Imagine that A loses her wallet, B finds it, A discovers that B has her wallet, and
A demands its return at gunpoint. No illicit property transfer. But still, we can agree, not
cool.

714

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

the robber, the mapmaker wants power and uses aggressive and
harmful cartographic manipulations to get it, by reallocating (i.e.
taking) it from the rival party. And like the robbery victim, the rival

party wants its power back, and wants the federal courts to give it back
by invalidating the "power-stealing" map as an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander.

The Rucho Court declined this request for federal judicial
intervention for two reasons. 117 First, it framed the issue exclusively in
terms of power transfer, essentially treating partisan gerrymandering

as theft and nothing more. 118 Second, it concluded that, while this kind
of electoral theft may be unlawful, the Court could not intervene,
because it could not determine the logically prior question upon which
any claim of theft depends: the original distribution of electoral
property rights, i.e. the pre-theft allocation of political power.11 9 In
fairness to the Rucho majority, gerrymandering is quite different from
your run-of-the-mill robbery in this respect: there is rarely a
disagreement over whether the wallet taken during the robbery
properly belongs to the robber or his victim; but there is strong
disagreement about the lawful allocation of political power from which
partisan gerrymandering improperly departs. In this sense, partisan

gerrymandering is an unusual kind of robbery, like one perpetrated by
one spouse against the other during the pendency of a bitter divorce
and legal dispute over the proper allocation of marital assets. Is the
husband stealing money from his wife, or simply taking back what is
rightfully his? Unsure, the Rucho majority thought it better not to get
involved.
But robbery is more than theft, and partisan gerrymandering is more
than the reallocation of political power. And just as robbery occasions
both individual and societal harms independent of any illicit property
transfer, partisan gerrymandering inflicts both individual and
structural harms independent of any illicit power transfer. Even if a
stranger has your wallet, or an estranged spouse has your money, you

shouldn't demand it back at gunpoint. Robbery is about money, but it's
not only about money. And partisan gerrymandering is about power,

but it's not only about power. We can define and proscribe robbery
without determining how much money each party should have. And we
can define and proscribe partisan gerrymandering without deciding
how many seats each political party should have.

117. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2493-2502.
118. Id. at 2493-2498.
119. Id. at 2498-2502.
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B. Bond Redux: Speech-Based CandidateExclusion
In the 1960s, the Georgia House of Representatives refused to seat a
duly-elected member who opposed the draft and the Vietnam War. 120
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that Bond's exclusion violated
his First Amendment rights in a way that burdened his constituents
and undermined the operation of representative government. 121 (Note
that the Court decided solely on First Amendment grounds and
explicitly declined to consider any claim of racial animus.) 122
Now, suppose that, some six decades later, Bond's son, Michael
Julian Bond, 123 wins a seat to the Georgia House and then makes
political statements that incur the wrath of his fellow representatives.
Michael's political opponents have read Bond v. Floyd,124 so they know
they cannot simply exclude him from House membership because they
find his views repugnant. But they've also read Rucho, so they know the
federal courts will not entertain claims of "partisan gerrymandering" so
long as districts are equipopulous and racial considerations do not
predominate. So, shortly before the next election, they redraw the map
for state legislative districts, "wiggl[ing] and joggl[ing] boundary
lines,"1 25 not to malapportion or racially gerrymander or maximize

power for one party, but to exclude Michael's home from the House
district he represents. Presto: Michael is disqualified from seeking
reelection because he does not meet the durational residency
requirement for candidacy. 126
When Michael challenges this new map in federal court as a First
Amendment violation, which precedent governs: Bond or Rucho? If we
120. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1966). Julian Bond, like most of the 136th
House district, was Black. While Bond challenged this refusal and litigated the case all
the way up to the Supreme Court, he won his seat twice more by overwhelming margins.
Ttwice more the House refused to seat him, insisting his views "bring discredit and
disrespect" to the House, give aid and comfort to America's enemies, violate federal law,
and demonstrate his inability to sincerely take the oath of office.
121. Id. at 135-37.
122. Id. at 135.
123. Michael Julian Bond has worked for the Atlanta branch of the NAACP and
currently serves on the Atlanta City Council. Council Members: Michael Julian Bond,
Atlanta City Council, https://citycouncil.atlantaga.gov/council-members/michael-julianbond (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
124. 385 U.S. 116.
125. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 738, 752, n.18).
126. GA. CONST. art. III, § II, ¶ III(b) ("At the time of their election, the members of the
House of Representatives . . . shall have been legal residents of. . . the district from which
elected for at least one year."). Other states impose similar durational electoral district
residency requirements on candidates. E.g., CAL. CONST. art IV, § 2 (one year); IDAHO
CONST. art. III, § 6 (same); MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 41 (two years).
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read Rucho broadly, the federal court must reject the challenge as a
non-justiciable political question. But if we read Rucho narrowly to
foreclose only claims of allocative vote dilution, the relevant precedent
is Bond, not Rucho. Michael's claim is not allocative, and so it does not
trigger the justiciability problems that allocative claims entail and upon
which Rucho's holding was based. 127 Michael is not asking a federal
court to apportion or reallocate political power between rival political
parties. Indeed, it is irrelevant to Michael's claim whether he runs as a
Democrat, a Republican, a third-party candidate or an independent.
The legal harm he alleges is not the intentional suppression of his
party's power, but the intentional suppression of his individual voice as
retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment rights to free
expression. This violation of individual First Amendment rights
burdens Michael's constituents and undermines the operation of
representative government irrespective of any votes-seats relationship.

The court can adjudicate this claim without any consideration of how
many seats a party should get, or what departure from this baseline the
constitution tolerates. All the court has to do is apply the eminently
discernible and manageable standard of Bond v. Floyd and declare it
impermissible for a legislative body to exclude a legislator because it
disagrees with that legislator's views. Whether the exclusion is
accomplished directly through legislative fiat or indirectly by redrawing
the district boundary around his house is a distinction without a
difference.
C. Differential GeographicRepresentationalBurdens
The more relevant and interesting case of non-allocative harm
involves burdens on geographic-based representational interests. This
sort of harm happens all the time and a three-judge federal panel
deciding a partisan gerrymandering case recently acknowledged it in a
brief passage of its opinion that has not yet received the attention it
deserves. 128
The case was Ohio A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Householder,129
and it was decided just eight weeks before Rucho. 130 (The case was cited
in Justice Kagan's dissent, but not in Rucho's majority opinion.)13 1 In
Householder, a three-judge panel unanimously found that Ohio's
127. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502.
128. See Householder, 373 F. Supp. 3d at 1074-75.
129. 373 F. Supp. 3d 978.
130. Householder was decided May 3, 2019. Id. at 978. Rucho was decided June 27,
2019. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2484.
131. Id. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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congressional map violated the Equal Protection Clause, 132 the First
Amendment, and the Elections Clause.13 3 This conclusion was mostly
based on an allocative vote dilution theory of partisan gerrymandering,
under which statewide evidence of partisan effect on the votes-seats
relationship supports district-specific evidence of vote-diluting packing
and cracking.1 34 But the panel also recognized a First Amendment
associational claim requiring a "separate analysis" based on the
premise that "[t]he 'associational harm of a partisan gerrymander . . is
distinct from vote dilution."' 1 3 5 Many of the representational burdens
identified by the panel, like those Justice Kagan suggested in her Gill
concurrence, are logically dependent on an underlying premise of
misallocated political power. 136 But while the panel catalogued many
allocative or quasi-allocative burdens, it also referred to several
non-allocative representational burdens, burdens that make it harder
for people to engage in the associational activities of representative

democracy and that critically do not depend on the allocation or
misallocation of political power to rival parties. 137 Many of these
references credit the findings of political scientist David Niven, one of
the plaintiffs expert witnesses. 138 Niven identified meaningful
representational burdens independent of any votes-seat relationship.
For example, he cited political science literature demonstrating that the
splitting of neighborhoods, cities, and counties causes a demobilizing
effect by rendering campaigning more difficult. 139 And he found that the
challenged map differentially imposed this burden on members of the
disfavored party. 140 Specifically, it split over 50% more census tracts
than its predecessor, 141 and it split a higher proportion of Democratic

132. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
133. Householder, 373 F. Supp. 3d at 1150-51, 1154.
134. Id. at 1150-51.
135. Id. at 1151 (quoting Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring)).
136. Id. at 1155-59 (citing adverse impact on candidate recruitment, fundraising,
mobilization, and campaign activity). The Householder panel acknowledges the
quasi-allocative nature of the associational claim, suggesting that a "partisan
gerrymandering is a double-barreled constitutional issue" and many of the facts relevant
to this claim "overlap" with those relevant to the vote-dilution claim because the right to
associate overlaps with the right to cast an effective vote. Id. at 1154-55 (citing Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)).
137. Id. at 994.
138. Id. at 1038.
139. Id. at 1040.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1039.
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census tracts (around 13.5%) than Republican census tracts (around
9.5%).142
David Niven and I are currently developing this idea into a new way
to

conceptualize

and measure

partisan gerrymandering that

is

"geographic" rather than "allocative." Our approach does not rely on
any votes-seats relationship. Instead, we consider the extent to which a
map differentially burdens the legally cognizable representational
interests of disfavored voters, where those interests are defined in
terms of the very geographic relationships that the Rucho majority and
opponents of redistricting reform cite as justifying electoral districting
in the first place. We identify multiple quantitative measures that
capture geographic representational interests well established in state
law, judicial decisions, and academic scholarship. One is based on the
proximity to a Congressperson's district office. Others are based on the
alignment of district boundaries with those of census tracts, counties,
and electoral boundaries for other offices. Any map will necessarily
burden these interests to some extent-voters must travel some
distance to visit the district office of their congressional representative,
and district boundaries must sometimes split census tracts, counties, or
other electoral districts to meet legitimate requirements like population
equality and Voting Rights Act compliance. But mapmakers should
eschew-and courts should scrutinize-district lines that differentially
and unnecessarily impose these burdens on groups of voters defined by
partisan affiliation or race. Many current maps do precisely that, to a
statistically significant degree, especially when enacted through a
legislative process dominated by one party.
V. CONCLUSION

Partisan gerrymandering imposes harm beyond any distortion of the
votes-seats relationship. This is why federal courts can adjudicate
non-allocative claims of partisan gerrymandering without encountering

the justiciability problems entailed by allocative claims. This
trans-allocative framing of partisan gerrymandering is relevant in other
contexts. If state courts adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims
based on state constitutional provisions, they will encounter
justiciability issues similar to those identified by the Rucho majority. So
non-allocative claims may help state courts, too. More broadly, greater
emphasis on the non-allocative aspects of partisan gerrymandering may

prove helpful outside the courtroom: to analysts studying partisan
gerrymandering and to mapmakers trying to draw fair maps.

142. Id. at 1040.

